Abstract: A natural outcome of the emerging pledge and review approach to international climate change policy is interest in comparing mitigation effort among countries. Domestic publics and stakeholders will have an interest in knowing if peer countries are undertaking (or planning to undertake) comparable effort in mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, if considered inadequate to address the risks posed by climate change, the aggregate effort will likely prompt broader interest in identifying those countries where greater effort is arguably warranted on the basis of peer comparisons. Both assessments require metrics of effort and comparisons among countries. We propose a framework for such an exercise, drawing from a set of principles for designing and implementing informative metrics. We present a template for organizing metrics on mitigation effort, for both ex--ante and ex--post review. We also provide preliminary assessments of effort along emissions, price, and cost metrics for post-2020 climate policy contributions by China, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. We close with a discussion of the role of academics and civil society in promoting transparency and facilitating the evaluation and comparison of effort.
Introduction
Free riding is the primary threat to any international climate change treaty. Any country considering taking domestic actions to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions has a legitimate concern that other countries will not undertake similar actions to contribute to the global public good of a stable climate. Since the costs of mitigating emissions are local, while the benefits are global, the prospect of free--riding weakens incentives for countries to take serious action against climate change. This is especially the case within the current multilateral framework in which commitments are effectively self--enforced (whether they are so--called legally binding or not). If one country is proactive in its emission mitigation policy, then it will enjoy fewer benefits if other countries free--ride and fail to deliver own comparable domestic mitigation policies. Moreover, absent such reciprocal action, unilateral mitigation efforts increases the prospect of adverse competitiveness impacts, which could raise the costs borne by the proactive country and provide a political economy context for inhibiting domestic action against climate change. In light of these factors undermining international cooperation and meaningful mitigation effort, a system of transparency and comparability of effort appear necessary for a successful international climate agreement (Aldy, 2014) . Indeed, even if the international community does not reach agreement on the design and implementation of a transparency regime and methods for evaluating and comparing effort among countries, the largest economies -in response to domestic political pressures -will develop their own capacity for doing so. Nonetheless, in the long term, a successful pledge and review regime will need a substantive, legitimate review mechanism (Schelling, 1997; Pizer, 2007) .
To facilitate the comparison of mitigation effort, we have developed a framework for assessing various metrics of effort, building on the work in Aldy and Pizer (2014) . We discuss some of the advantages and shortcomings of various metrics, including the issues requiring resolution to enable comparisons, such as agreement on an appropriate system of exchange rates to compare effort measured in local currency units. We also consider potential facilitative and normative frameworks for using these metrics. We then employ the DNE21+ model to illustrate a suite of metrics for China, the European Union, Russia and the United States based on their announcements for what will likely be their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) on the road to the 2015 Paris climate talks and their likely contributions post--Paris. We close with our suggestions for additional work, considerations for the design of ex ante and ex post reviews, and opportunities for academics and civil society to inform the review and comparability processes going forward.
UNFCCC Processes and Comparability of Effort
The concept of comparable effort has evolved over the past several decades in international climate change negotiations. emissions will continue to grow unless the reduction in emission intensity exceeds the economic growth rate; growing countries tend to experience a natural decline in emission intensity owing to technology improvement and changing economic structure of the economy;
and analysis has shown that emission intensity targets often become more stringent if a country grows slower than expected and less stringent if it grows faster than expected (Aldy, 2004; Newell and Pizer, 2008) . Comparing emission intensities among countries at a point in time also involves conversion of local currencies into a single currency. In recent years, interest among some developing countries has turned to emission goals specified as percentage reductions from a forecast level in a future year (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea pledged emission mitigation goals of this form through the Copenhagen Accord). In theory, by capturing the emission reduction directly associated with a climate mitigation program, such a metric for all countries represents a more comprehensive indicator of mitigation effort than emission levels relative to an historic base year or scaled by GDP. In practice, however, such a metric requires difficult and subjective judgments to calculate the baseline forecasts that define the emission goals. One question is how to address previous or planned mitigation policies-do those go into the baseline? Aside from such conceptual questions, forecasts require subjective assumptions upon which expert opinions will differ and, more importantly, which could be gamed to make a target appear more ambitious then it will likely be in practice. Even when forecasts are unbiased and well--developed, future observed outcomes can deviate from those forecasts for a variety of reasons unrelated to mitigation efforts. In this way, ex post analysis of mitigation effort will likely need to re--evaluate an associated baseline. In contrast, an observed carbon price bears a direct connection to effort, as it measures the marginal incentive levied through a country's mitigation policies. Comparing carbon prices across countries measures the degree to which a country is creating incentives for more or less expensive per ton mitigation efforts. Since countries implement domestic carbon prices in their local currencies, comparisons will require the use of (and raise questions of the appropriate) currency exchange rates. Moreover, explicit, observed, carbon prices may not comprehensively reflect mitigation effort. An explicit carbon price may be applied to only a subset of a country's emissions and thus be too narrow a measure of a country's mitigation efforts. It may fail to account for the effect of other, non--price policies -such as efficiency standards and renewable mandates -that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A country may also undermine the effectiveness of the carbon price by adjusting taxes downward for firms covered by the carbon price, through what is known as so--called fiscal cushioning (Wiener 1999) . Alternatively, one could consider implicit (or "effective") carbon prices that estimate the average cost of abatement associated with a specific climate policy or collection of policies. Such implicit prices have the advantage of potentially being applied more broadly, but the disadvantage of not being directly observed (i.e., produced by model simulations). They also do not reflect incentives passed down the production chain to end users, and tend to emphasize cost over effectiveness. We return to this latter point below when we discuss costs. Carbon prices may or may not be part of a country's policy mix and, even when they are, fiscal cushioning can depress their effectiveness. In contrast, energy prices are transparent and measurable with high frequency. Energy prices permit a net assessment of all price--based policies, including carbon pricing, and thus can mitigate concerns that a country engages in fiscal cushioning by simultaneously imposing a carbon tax and source--specific tax relief. Energy prices would still fail to capture most effects of non--price policies that mitigate emissions largely without influencing energy prices (which explains why they often attract political support). For countries pursuing such policies to a significant degree, energy prices could be a poor measure of effort. Moreover, not all energy price differences across countries or over time represent policy choices, but instead differences in resource endowments, transportation constraints, and other shifts in supply and demand. This suggests focusing at least in part on the divergence between producer and consumer prices caused by government policies and/or changes in energy prices over time.
8 The mitigation costs of any domestic climate policy are typically most closely aligned with economists' notion of mitigation effort. Ideally, such a metric captures the entirety of resources otherwise available for private consumption and citizen well--being that are diverted towards the public good of mitigating climate change. For that reason, it is intrinsically appealing in terms of being comprehensive. Expressed as a share of national income, or per capita, it could be scaled to be comparable across countries of vastly different sizes. The concern about the costs of combating climate change represents one of, if not the most, significant impediments to serious action by countries around the world. A metric to compare effort based on costs could promote confidence that the international effort is fair by ensuring that comparable countries bear comparable costs from their actions. Coupled with information about emission reductions, it could also highlight the potential advantages of some policies (that reduce more emissions with lower mitigation costs) over others. An assessment of intended (or ex post) policy costs alone runs the risk, however, of rewarding inefficient polices.
Such analysis could be coupled with calculations of the least--cost alternative to achieve the same reductions. This would simultaneously emphasize the potential value of cost--effective policies and provide a metric that does not rewards inefficiency. Estimating costs, in any case, requires economic assumptions and detailed modeling frameworks for evaluating economic changes in specific sectors and national economies.
Viewed alone, none of the six types of metrics described here do well against all the principles. Emission levels and intensity do particularly poorly in terms of comprehensiveness, of the metrics will be directly observed, some will require a forecast, and others will require modeling analyses. In modest contrast, Table 2 presents a template for an ex post analysis, such as the "review" in the pledge and review regime being advanced in the current international climate negotiations. In this case, the summary of a country's climate program is the implemented contribution, as opposed to what it intended to do under the INDC. In addition, some of the metrics have transitioned from being the product of a model prospectively estimating the measure for a given country to being directly observed. Nonetheless, a number of metrics will require counter--factual forecasts and economic modeling even in an ex post exercise-for example, baseline emissions and economic activity absent policy interventions. So long as the review of effort addresses measures beyond physical emission outputs or observed market prices, it is likely that economic tools will need to be employed to quantify effort and organize the heterogeneous contributions in a manner to permit comparisons. In addition, standard economic tools may be employed even for observed metrics, such as aggregating observed energy prices over various fuels over a period of a year or more, to construct a summary of prices. Finally, economic tools may also serve to illustrate the impacts of interactions from the implementation of individual countries' INDCs. First, the construction of any given quantitative metric creates a natural rank--ordering of countries. Moreover, the measures for a given metric illustrate proximity of any pair of countries. Whether the metric is emission reduction versus a base year, emission intensity, carbon price, or mitigation cost as a share of GDP, those with the lowest emissions or highest price or cost can be identified along with those sharing similar values. Countries could be compared in absolute terms (e.g., the level of emissions per GDP or per capita) or in terms of a rate of improvement (e.g., the percent decline in emissions per GDP per year). Countries could be compared based on each individual metric, or based on a composite suite of measures. This latter approach would require an algorithm for integrating information from the various metrics, perhaps akin to how the human development index aggregates information on various measures of economic, social, and human well--being. Importantly, this does not answer the question of whether a country's performance is satisfactory or not, but it does provide a relative comparison. Second, countries can be arranged (or self--associate) into peer groups for relative comparisons. Such an approach recognizes that relative comparison among all countries is not particularly useful. Countries vary significantly in their emission contribution and capacity to mitigate, an idea reflected in the UNFCCC's concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities." Peer group comparisons are a first step in this direction.
To illustrate this peer group approach, consider the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. As the largest countries and emitters, these countries have the most to gain and lose from leveraging (or failing to leverage) mutual mitigation efforts. The international community might agree on several official metrics, or these countries might themselves select a set of metrics to compare efforts. The MEF countries could then voluntarily agree to present data and analysis regarding their future emission commitments in order to produce these agreed metrics and to demonstrate feasibility and applicability of such a process.
These first two approaches do not directly answer the question of whether a given country is doing "enough," but they provide a means of comparison that can facilitate stronger efforts in the future. Without a normative judgment about the allocation of mitigation effort across countries, analysis of how each country's efforts relate to those of its peers provides the basis for a national government to make its own determinations about others' performance. A third approach, however, is to consider normative, absolute benchmarks for countries' contributions. Such metrics could be derived from a negotiated emission commitment. For example, under the Kyoto Protocol, 1990 emissions served as the reference year for targets that were defined as changes relative to 1990 levels.
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Countries had individualized targets ranging from --8% (most European countries) to +10% (Iceland) relative to 1990 levels, presumably reflecting their particular circumstances or capacity-but the adjustments were ad hoc. That is, there was no formula to say why some country's targets were --8% and others were +10%. This focused the debate on effort and which country was "doing more" in terms of a larger percentage below 1990 levels (even if, as we note above, emissions in a later year relative to their 1990 level may have nothing to do with emission mitigation effort). An alternative to such ad hoc adjustments is to develop a formulaic approach to address the normative question of what countries "should" do. A number of papers in the literature have addressed the normative issues of allocating the burden of effort (e.g., Bosetti and Frankel, 2012; den Elzen et al., 2006; Groenenberg et al., 2004; Gupta, 2007; Hof and den Elzen, 2010; Höhne et al., 2006; Michaelowa et al., 2005) . Of course, this discussion illustrates the relationship between benchmarks and commitments/contributions, and it is not obvious that negotiators will agree on a set of normative benchmarks in a framework organized around sovereign, voluntary pledges of emission contributions.
We can highlight a few issues that merit consideration in the discussion of potential absolute benchmarks. First, in light of the Lima Call to Action's provision requiring an assessment of the adequacy of collective effort in the submitted INDCs before the Paris talks, it could be natural to design a benchmark associated with the UNFCCC's long--term objectives. For example, the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements identify a long--term objective to limit warming to no more than 2°C, which could be linked (with admitted uncertainty) to a trajectory of cumulative emission levels. One way to present this would be to examine the cumulative emissions over the INDC horizon, and compare to the emission budgets associated with various likelihoods of exceeding 2 degrees. Without a formula for sharing a cumulative emission budget, however, this would not measure adequacy at the national level.
Second, one could design a benchmark based on the social cost of carbon, which has been used by a few countries in informing their domestic emission mitigation programs (Pizer et al., 2014) . Such a benchmark would work quite well for evaluating and comparing carbon price and carbon tax metrics (as well as average mitigation cost, computed from cost divided by abatement). 
Illustration of Comparability of Effort
To provide an initial illustration of the comparability of effort, we focus on the announcements for post--2020 mitigation contributions by several of the largest economies in the world, including China, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. In particular,
China has announced that its emissions will peak by 2030 and that non--fossil energy will represent at least 20% of its fuel share in that year. The European Union has announced that it will reduce economy--wide emissions to 40% below their 1990 levels by 2030. Russia announced that it would limit its emissions to 25% to 30% below their 1990 levels by 2030. The United
States has announced that it will reduce economy--wide net emissions to 26% to 28% below their 2005 levels by 2025. The EU and US commitments are part of their recently submitted INDCs, it is unclear whether China's INDC will be more specific than its announced emission peak.
We have employed the RITE DNE21+ model in undertaking this assessment. DNE21+ is a linear programming model that focuses on minimizing the world energy system costs (Akimoto et al., 2008; 2012; RITE, 2015) . Given the application of a specific policy, the model searches for the solution that minimizes energy system costs globally. The model can run over 2000--2050, with initial 5--year timesteps that extend to 10--year timesteps in the latter end of the model period. The world is divided into 54 regions, which permits more granularity of analysis than many energy--economic computable general equilibrium models. The model includes 200+
technologies in a bottom--up modeling scheme, including coal, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, solar photovoltaics, biomass, nuclear power, and ocean energy. The model also includes interregional trade in coal, crude oil, natural gas, ethanol, hydrogen, electricity, and carbon dioxide allowances. The model begins with an explicit characterization of existing facility vintages. While this model is quite rich in how it captures the energy economy around the world, it does not cover non--energy related greenhouse gas emissions or land use change.
For some countries, such as those with significant agriculture--related methane emissions or substantial deforestation and reforestation activities, alternative analytic frameworks would be recommended. See RITE (2015) for more details. Table 3 presents the preliminary results for China, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. The table presents metrics for emissions relative to various base years, emissions intensity in levels and changes over time, changes in emission relative to emission forecasts, estimated marginal abatement costs, and total abatement costs scaled by GDP. As suggested earlier, the choice of base year for emissions and emissions intensity matters significantly in the levels and rankings among countries. While there is likely to be disagreement over business--as--usual forecasts, we present our results using our best estimate. The uncertainties associated with the implementation of some contributions, such as China's peak year objective, also require modelers to make important assumptions that merit sensitivity analysis. Further work will expand the full suite of metrics and models. As additional countries table their INDCs, we may also be able to investigate the emission, price, cost impacts using the DNE21+ (and other) modeling frameworks. Furthermore, future work will also consider alternative analytic frameworks to identify the most robust metrics and measures. or the subsequent round of talks. The reaction may also be in the form increased domestic activity beyond the level of the current pledge. Moreover, the review process itself may also permit countries to learn how to improve the design of their own policy response over time, promoting cost--effectiveness and environmental ambition (Aldy, 2013) . In considering metrics for comparability, a number of relatively deep differences emerge. First, some metrics are relatively easy to observe and measure-total emissions and explicit emission prices-but may be one or more steps removed from the key concepts of effort and underlying policy implementation. Meanwhile, the concepts that are closer to effort-emission reductions, implicit prices, and costs-are harder to observe and measure directly. These will require explicit modeling tools, leading to more subjective and possibly divergent estimates. We have presented one set of preliminary modeling analyses to illustrate the application of this framework for China, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. Developing metrics for assessing comparability of effort, compiling data and related analysis in light of these metrics, and reporting the results of the assessments will require a serious, transparent, and legitimate process (Aldy and Stavins, 2012; Aldy, 2014 ). Yet official agreement on specific metrics and a comprehensive policy surveillance mechanism is a tall order. In the meantime, independent researchers need to fill the gap. An array of easily available metrics could be developed and data collected by existing international organizations to facilitate comparisons in the near term-in advance of any official policy surveillance.
Unofficial but independent expert analysis could further synthesize these data to create some of the more challenging but informative metrics. In turn, stakeholders and other users could provide feedback on the feasibility, integrity, and precision of various metrics to enable further refinement of metrics and to inform the deliberations over metrics going forward. Tables   Table 1 
